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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of obtaining a patent on the mobility of employee inventors who are
at the beginning of their careers. We suggest that patents make human capital more specific to the
employer. As a result, we expect that patenting leads to lower levels of mobility. We draw on U.S. patent
application data for the period 2001-2012 to analyze this issue. Using average examiner leniency as an
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The patent system is a major instrument for articulating government innovation policy.
Patent rights are expected to provide incentives for innovation and to foster the diffusion of
knowledge. Economists, legal scholars and policy advisors, however, have long questioned the
effectiveness and efficiency of the patent system in reaching these goals (see, e.g., Federal Trade
Commission, 2003). First, awarding monopoly rights as a reward for innovation involves the
obvious deadweight loss and rent-seeking costs associated with monopolies (Nordhaus, 1969;
Boldrin and Levine, 2013). Furthermore, it is unclear whether patents help or hinder the dif-
fusion of knowledge and, ultimately, the generation of further innovation. On the one hand,
historical evidence shows that the use of patent protection encouraged the geographical diffu-
sion of innovations in the chemical industry (Moser, 2011) and the exchange of ideas in markets
for technology (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999). On the other hand, increased fragmentation of
ownership rights among firms, combined with the recombinant nature of new knowledge, may
lead to steep increases in the transaction costs associated with transferring patent-protected
knowledge (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), thus hampering its diffusion. Recent research on the
impact of patents on subsequent innovation is also inconclusive. While Galasso and Schanker-
man (2015) provide evidence of substantial increases in citations of patents that are invalidated
by courts, Sampat and Williams (2015) show that patents on genes do not hinder subsequent
related innovations.
Complementing this debate on patents and the diffusion of knowledge, this article studies
an indirect, albeit important, mechanism through which patents may affect the circulation of
knowledge: inventor mobility. Since Arrow (1962, p. 615) noted that “mobility of personnel
among firms provides a way of spreading information,” economists have identified labor mobility
as a key conduit through which knowledge spillovers occur. In this respect, the mobility of the
R&D personnel responsible for technological advances is particularly relevant. Previous research
has documented the inter-firm transfer of technical knowledge following inventor moves (Almeida
and Kogut, 1999; Maliranta et al., 2009; Singh and Agrawal, 2011). Therefore, understanding
the causal relationship between patent protection and inventor mobility will allow us to have a
more complete picture of the role of patents in the diffusion of knowledge.
We explicitly explore the effect of patenting on the career moves of the inventors responsible
for the underlying innovations. Following the existing literature on intellectual property (IP)
rights, we hypothesize a negative effect of patents on inventor mobility. Patents grant their
owners (usually the employer of the inventor) a time-limited right to prevent others from using
a given technology. Consequently, they restrict the amount of knowledge that an inventor
can effectively use following a move to a new employer (Kim and Marschke, 2005; Agarwal
et al., 2009). Furthermore, by conferring monopoly power over a given technology, patent rights
increase the value of retaining the creators of that technology in the implementation phase.
This makes the human capital of inventors with (issued) patents more specific to their current
employers and makes them less likely to move.
Testing the aforementioned hypothesis poses an important methodological challenge. Since
patented innovations are inherently different from non-patented ones (as their inventors are also
likely to be), a simple comparison of inventors who patent with those who do not might lead to
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conclusions that only mirror the underlying dissimilarities. First, the firm decision to apply for
patent protection depends on the characteristics of the given innovation (see Criscuolo et al.,
2015), which may also reflect certain attributes of the human capital of its inventor(s). Second,
the decision to apply for a patent is likely to be affected by the dynamism of the inventor
labor market, as suggested by Kim and Marschke (2005). Moreover, the applications that are
finally granted patents are a selected group of innovations, namely, those that imply sufficient
advancement in the state of the art according to the patent office requirements (i.e., novelty
and non-obviousness of the inventive step). These requirements are arguably more likely to
be achieved by talented inventors. Hence, a straightforward comparison between patented and
non-patented innovations is not appropriate.
We investigate the effect of patenting on inventor mobility by comparing the trajectories
of inventors with different numbers of issued patent (among those with a given number of
applications filed). In order to estimate the causal relationship, we use variation in leniency
across patent examiners as a source of exogenous variation in granted patents. Patent examiner
leniency has been recently used as an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of patents
on subsequent cumulative innovation (Sampat and Williams, 2015) and on venture capital–
backed startup success (Gaule´, 2015; Farre-Mensa et al., 2017). The validity of this instrument
is supported by interviews with employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) regarding the allocation of patent applications to examiners (Cockburn et al., 2003;
Lemley and Sampat, 2012), as well as by our own exogeneity tests.
Our empirical analysis is based on the career trajectories of 69,136 inventors who filed their
first patent application with the USPTO between 2001 and 2012. By identifying individual
inventors’ career moves from patent application data, our results point to a negative effect
of patenting on mobility. In particular, one additional patent granted (due to a “lucky” ex-
aminer assignment) decreases an inventor’s probability of changing employers by 25 percent.
This negative effect increases to 42 percent for “discrete” technologies (such as pharmaceuti-
cals and chemicals), where individual inventions are more clearly linked to marketable products
and patent rights protect them more effectively (Cohen et al., 2000). On the other hand, the
estimated effect is much weaker in “complex” technologies (such as electronics), where a given
product is typically associated with many potentially patentable elements, meaning that an indi-
vidual patent confers less protection on the final product. Overall, these results suggest that, by
providing firms with monopoly power over a given technology, patents make the human capital
of the creators of the underlying innovation more specific to the current employer. Additional
tests show that the negative effect of patenting on mobility is stronger for inventors with fewer
co-authors and for inventors working outside the technological core of their firm, suggesting
that patents play a stronger role in the absence of other sources of firm-specific human capital.
Finally, and consistent with our specific human capital hypothesis, we document that patents
most steeply decrease the mobility of inventors to firms that work in the same core technological
areas as their current employers.
The results of our study provide new insights into several domains. First, we contribute to
research on knowledge diffusion and inventor mobility by showing that the institutional effect
of the patent offices on mobility is not neutral. Scholars have traditionally relied on patent
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data to examine the impact on mobility of institutional factors such as trade-secret laws or non-
compete contracts (Fallick et al., 2006; Marx et al., 2009; Png and Samila, 2015) and inventors
characteristics such as productivity (Hoisl, 2006; Palomeras and Melero, 2010). However, little is
known about whether and how the mobility of those employees is itself affected by patents. Our
study aligns with recent work by Agarwal et al. (2009) and Ganco et al. (2015), who show that the
degree of litigiousness of patent-holding firms is related to the amount of knowledge that moving
inventors can effectively transfer and, consequently, to inventor turnover rates. In this respect,
our paper provides evidence on the causal role that patent grants play in the overall process.
Second, our paper adds a dimension to the ongoing debate over the role of patents in innovation
policy. The design of a patent system is expected to address the tradeoff between the incentive
to innovate and the diffusion of knowledge. Our results suggest that, by reducing the inter-firm
mobility of inventors, patents may preclude the transmission not only of formally protected
knowledge but also of tacit technical and organizational knowledge. The findings also imply
that patents may shift incentives to invest in inventive skills from the employee-inventors to the
patent-holding employers. Finally, our results have an important methodological implication.
Many research questions in the area of innovation have traditionally been addressed using data
on granted patents, from mobility studies to knowledge spillover estimations and co-inventor
network analyses. Our evidence indicates that future research should take into account the
effect of patent grants on the behavior of inventors and subsequent knowledge flows in order to
avoid potentially biased results.
2. Background
The thesis of this article is that patent grants make the human capital of inventors more
specific to their employers. It builds upon the idea that patent rights provide their owners with
an increased ability to protect their intellectual assets and, consequently, to obtain a monopoly
over the underlying technology.1 In addition, the labor contracts of R&D workers typically
include provisions by which employers retain property rights over their employees’ inventions.
This implies that patents effectively constrain the inventor from freely using that protected
knowledge. The consequences for mobility, however, are not straightforward.
The first element to take into account is the balance of incentives of current employers and
rivals to bid for the inventor. Consider first the author of an innovation that, because of a
lack of patent rights, is only weakly protected. On the one hand, the ability of competitors to
replicate the invention would be clearly enhanced by employing the original inventor. Thus, they
have incentives to poach her. On the other hand, the current employer may also have strong
incentives to retain the inventor in order to secure monopoly profits by preventing her from
moving to a competitor. The joint-profit effect (Budd et al., 1993) suggests that, in the absence
of strong property rights, incumbents will have stronger incentives than their rivals to bid for
their inventors, unless their products are differentiated enough in the market (Fosfuri et al.,
1Survey evidence gathered by Cohen et al. (2000) suggests that firms may prefer alternative mechanisms of
protection, such as secrecy or lead time, over patents in a wide range of settings. Our study considers the universe
of inventions for which an application for patent protection has been filed. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
assume that applicants in this population expect to obtain an increase in protection from a granted patent.
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2001).2 Suppose that the incumbent now increases the protection of an innovation by obtaining
a patent. To the extent that property rights prevent the unauthorized commercial exploitation of
technological replicas by rivals, patents will eliminate the above-mentioned strategic incentives
to either poach inventors (rivals) or retain them (incumbents) because rivals cannot use the
inventors’ knowledge for replication and incumbents do not need to retain the inventor to secure
monopoly profits. Thus, the appropriation effect of patent grants on inventor mobility may
be positive or negative, depending on the degree of differentiation among the products of the
incumbent and its rivals. In a non-differentiated market, the incumbent’s incentives to retain
the inventor disappear with (strong) patents, so mobility increases with respect to a situation
without property rights. In a differentiated market, rivals’ incentives to poach the inventor tend
to disappear with patents, and thus, mobility decreases with respect to a situation without
patents.
A second important element to consider is the relevance of the inventors’ knowledge for the
successful implementation of an innovation by a patent holder. While patents may allow their
holders to obtain monopoly profits when bringing the innovation to the market, the involvement
of the inventor in implementation activities can enhance the exploitation of this monopoly power.
This makes the human capital of inventors effectively complementary to patent protection. The
development of an innovation into an actual product (or process) ready to be launched in the
market (or internally implemented) is not a trivial task, and it usually benefits considerably
from the involvement of the creator(s) of the innovation. In a study of licensing contracts for
patented inventions in the biomedical industry, Hegde (2014) reports the use of clauses specifying
the complementary knowledge that should be transferred to the licensee along with the patent
in order to successfully develop the innovation. Some of these clauses explicitly require the
personal involvement of the inventor in the process, as well as monetary compensation for their
effort. These cases illustrate the importance of non-codified knowledge for the implementation
of patented technologies, particularly the involvement of their creators. Maurseth and Svens-
son (2015) provide further evidence suggesting the importance of the inventor’s involvement in
successfully bringing an innovation to market using a sample of commercially exploited patents
generated by small firms. This evidence indicates that inventors are inputs in the implementa-
tion of their innovation and that they are especially valuable when the latter is patent protected.
According to this complementarity effect, therefore, patents increase the internal value of the
inventor to the patent holder, generating some firm-specific human capital and decreasing the
probability that inventors switch employers.
In sum, we expect patents to reduce inventor mobility to the extent that they confer
monopoly power that can only be fully exploited by keeping the inventor in-house (comple-
mentarity effect) and that alternative employers develop sufficiently differentiated products (ap-
propriation effect). In empirical terms, previous related research suggests that the relationship
between property rights protection and mobility may go in this direction. Kim and Marschke
(2005) provide evidence that innovative firms tend to file for patent protection more in contexts
2In a non-differentiated market, an incumbent’s incentives to maintain a monopoly situation (as opposed to
a duopoly one) will be greater than or equal to those of rivals seeking duopoly profits. As noted by Fosfuri
et al. (2001), however, this is not necessarily the case if there is some product differentiation or if the intensity of
competition is low.
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with highly dynamic R&D labor markets. However, they do not specifically study the direction
of the effect of patents on mobility. In a related study, Ganco et al. (2015) find that the out-
bound mobility of the inventors of patented innovations is significantly lower in innovative firms
with strong reputations for patent litigation. Outside the realm of patent enforcement, Png and
Samila (2015) show that the mobility of qualified workers is lower in U.S. states with stronger
enforcement of trade-secret laws.
If patents have a detrimental effect on inventor mobility because their human capital becomes
relatively more valuable to their current employer, we should expect that the impact on mobility
is heterogeneous across contingencies. First, our argument that the negative effect of patents on
mobility is caused by the monopoly power they confer implies that the size of the impact should
differ with the effectiveness of patent protection across technology fields. Both the appropriation
effect (resulting from changes in the balance of incentives to poach and retain the inventor) and
the complementarity effect (arising from the role of the inventor in the implementation of the
innovation) will be more intense when patents offer stronger protection. Therefore, the negative
effect of patents on mobility will be more pronounced in settings of higher patent effectiveness.
Second, we expect other sources of inventors’ firm-specific human capital to act as substitutes
for patent protection. Workers’ firm-specific skills are tied to a particular firm and have limited
applicability to outside firms. This results in a lower relative outside value of employees’ human
capital in the labor market and leads to a lower probability of turnover (Becker, 1962). In
particular, patents operate as a source of specificity of an inventor’s human capital by creating
a legally induced gap between the inside and the outside value of her skills that reduces her
probability of moving. We expect this effect to be weaker when other sources of complementarity
(either legally or technically induced) with the current employer make an inventor’s skills firm
specific. The reason is that if an inventor’s skills are already firm specific, she will be unable
to fully apply her skills at a new employer, even if the underlying knowledge is not patented.
In contrast, when the inventor’s skills are general and can be readily applied to alternative
employers, patent protection should have a larger negative effect on mobility.
Third, obtaining a patent may affect different types of inter-firm moves differently. Inventors
may be induced to leave their companies for a variety of reasons, and replicating their innovations
elsewhere may be only one of them. The above discussion of how patents affect the balance of
bids to appropriate the knowledge associated with the innovation only concerns firms that are
close enough in the technological space to be able to implement this technology. Firms that are
technologically distant can also be considered alternative employers of the focal firm’s inventors,
but they are less likely to be interested in the specific innovation than are technologically close
competitors. Hence, the appropriation effect of patents on mobility will be weaker for moves to
technologically distant employers. On the other hand, the complementarity effect will reduce
the probability of moving to any alternative employer, since it only concerns the internal value
of the employment relationship between the inventor and the patent-holder. Thus, we expect
that even if patents reduce inventor mobility to both technologically distant and technologically
close firms, the effect will be more pronounced for moves to the latter group of employers as
long as they market sufficiently differentiated products.
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3. Description of the data
Our paper combines data from several sources. Our starting point is the USPTO Patent
Examination Research (PatEx) dataset, which sources its information from the public Patent
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) database. PAIR contains detailed information on
patent applications filed with the USPTO. For each application, it includes characteristics such
as the filing date, application type, patent class and subclass codes and current application
status, as well as data about the examination, such as the identity of the assigned examiner
and the “art unit” to which he belongs. From this dataset, we identify every original utility
patent application filed between 2001 and 2012, which totaled 3.6 million applications. We
are constrained to this time period due to data availability. The PAIR dataset contains data
only on applications that have been published (i.e., that are open to public scrutiny), and
it was not until late 2000 that applications were made public before a patent was granted
following the implementation of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA). This means
that since November 2000, publication happens regardless of whether the patent is granted,
whereas previously, only applications that were eventually issued patents were published. As
Graham et al. (2015) report, PAIR has very good coverage (95%) of regular utility filings from
2001 to 2012 (after that, truncation due to the publication lag affects coverage).3
We next turn to the information available from the USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset,
since the PAIR database does not identify the assignee (i.e., the firm) responsible for filing the
patent. Before September 2012, the USPTO considered the inventor to be the owner of a patent
application. However, inventors typically have contractual obligations to transfer ownership
to their employer. In order to do so, it was necessary to submit a chain of title from the
original owner (i.e., the inventor) to the assignee (i.e., the firm) to the patent office so that the
legal assignment could be made.4 The dataset tags those assignments, allowing us to identify the
assignee and the presumed employer of an inventor. From our original set of patent applications,
we identify 2.8 million applications that were re-assigned from the inventors to the employers.
Thereafter, we use data from the PatentsView initiative (www.patentsview.org) to identify
the inventors listed in our sample of applications and compile their career histories. This dataset
contains the results of the disambiguation algorithm specific for inventor data provided in Li
et al. (2014) and Balsmeier et al. (2015), which allows the robust identification of individual
inventors across patent applications (since 2001) and granted patents (since 1976).5 Through
these data, we can identify 2.1 million disambiguated individual inventors.
This initial set of inventors is substantially reduced due to the restrictions we impose. First,
we focus our analysis on inventors who filed their first patent application between 2001 and
3The remaining 5% of applications corresponds to two categories: those that were abandoned before the 18-
month publication lag and those that opted out of pre-grant publication (thus relinquishing the possibility of
international protection) and for which patents were not eventually granted (Graham et al., 2015). According
to these authors, who had access to internal USPTO application records, the applications covered by PatEx are
very similar to the population of USPTO applications.
4See 37 CFR 3.71 (pre-AIA), 35 U.S.C. 261 and Marco et al. (2015) for details.
5We are grateful to the PatentsView team for sharing this data with us. PatentsView is supported by the
Office of the Chief Economist at the USPTO, with additional support from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The PatentsView platform was established in 2012 and is a collaboration among the USPTO, USDA,
Center for the Science of Science and Innovation Policy at the American Institutes for Research, University of
California, Berkeley, Twin Arch Technologies, and Periscopic.
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2012. This sample represents a selection of inventors who are in their early careers, that is, in
the ten first years (at most) of inventive activity. We select these inventors for two main reasons.
Primarily, the initial steps of an inventor’s career are more likely to be affected by the outcome
of one or a few patent applications. Thus, if an effect of patents on mobility exists, it will be
more clearly detected among inventors beginning their careers. Moreover, regression to the mean
in random processes eliminates variation in average patent examiner leniency among inventors
with a large number of applications. Thus, our identification strategy would be less effective for
the subpopulation of very experienced inventors. Accordingly, we select only inventors with no
prior patenting experience before our sample period (i.e., before 2001).
Second, given our aim to detect the impact of the decision of the patent office, we focus
on inventors who receive at least one decision on an application during our sample period. In
particular, we require that they receive a first decision on their application prior to 2012 in order
to ensure that we have at least a nine-month window in which to observe mobility for the last
cohort in the data.6
Third, given our interest in employee inventors, we further restrict our sample to inventors
who started their careers (as measured by their patent filings) at a company. In order to capture
them, we select applications assigned to originating firms included in the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) Capital IQ database, which provides the names and transactions (such as mergers and
acquisitions) for the most extensive set of public and privately held U.S. firms (to the best of
our knowledge). In order to match the firm names from Capital IQ with the assignee names,
we first apply the name standardization procedure used in the NBER patent data project.7 We
then run the Jaro-Winkler algorithm (developed to assist in the disambiguation of names in the
U.S. Census) to correct for typos and misspellings, grouping together records with an overlap
of 90% or higher. Finally, we keep the final list of standardized assignee names that coincide
exactly with firm names in Capital IQ.
Following the previous literature, we infer inventor mobility based on a change in the assignee
between two consecutive applications (see, e.g., Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Trajtenberg et al.,
2006; Marx et al., 2009; Singh and Agrawal, 2011; Ganco et al., 2015). This approach has
a number of acknowledged limitations (Palomeras and Melero, 2010; Ge et al., 2016). First,
an inventor’s career can only be tracked if she is included repeatedly in patent applications.
Otherwise, she is censored out of the sample. One potential concern is that inventors whose
applications have not been granted may be less likely to apply again in the future.8 To the
extent that this attrition effect concerns similarly moving inventors and stayers, it would not
affect our estimation of the relationship between patent grants and mobility. A more serious
concern is that differences among firm patenting policies lead inventors that switch employers
to differ from stayers in their probability of being included in a future application. After all,
applying for patents is to a large extent a firm-level decision, and there may be substantial
heterogeneity among firms in the intensity of patent use. All the inventors in our population
have, by definition, been included in a patent application by their initial employers. Thus, it
6Note that our observation period effectively runs until September 2012 when the previously mentioned legal
process to reassign ownership from inventors to their firms was changed.
7See https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject.
8For example, while 50.6% of individuals whose first patent application was not granted never filed an applica-
tion again, the corresponding percentage decreases to 44.4% for individuals whose first application was granted.
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is natural to expect that all of them are initially employed by a firm with relatively high levels
of patent intensity and that moving inventors will switch, on average, to less patent-intensive
employers. This would imply that that our overall mobility rates would be underestimated and,
more importantly, that our estimated effect of patent grants on mobility would be subject to
attenuation bias. We address this issue in Section 5.3.
Second, identifying inventors through the names that appear in patent documents may lead
to misclassification errors. We mitigate them by using the disambiguation algorithm provided
by Balsmeier et al. (2015). As remarked by Ge et al. (2016), other potentially important sources
of misclassification in tracking mobility with patent data are the inability to detect the exact
point in time at which a move takes place (not problematic for our study), and the recording as
moves of contract R&D, collaborations, mergers or acquisitions. We address this last problem by
imposing some restrictions in order to consider a change in assignee as an actual move: (i) we do
not consider changes in the assignee that imply returns to an original employer in less than one
year from the supposed move under the assumption that they probably reflect contract research
or collaborations; and (ii) we do not consider apparent changes in employers due to mergers
and acquisitions, which are detected through information provided by Capital IQ. The existence
of some remaining misclassification error is unavoidable due to the nature of the large-scale
representative sample used in our study.
Thus, our final sample consists of inventors who started their research lives at one of our
identified Capital IQ firms during the period 2001-2011 and who receive a first decision on a
patent application prior to 2012. We track inventors from their first application until they
move or until their last application (during the sample period) with the originating firm. The
resulting dataset comprises 69,136 first-time inventors employed by 2,883 originating firms that
filed 404,016 patent applications during the sample period. In total, we detect 13,984 first-
employer changes for those inventors, averaging 0.20 moves per inventor.
4. Econometric modeling strategy
4.1. Baseline specification
To identify how the approval of an inventor’s patent application affects subsequent mobility,
we estimate the likelihood that an individual changes her employer between application year t
and application year t + 1, conditional on not having moved at t. We use a linear probability
model to estimate the hazard that an inventor moves:
Probabilityit (Yi,t+1 = 1) = α+ β Patents grantedit + γ Zit + δ Si + εit, (1)
where i indexes inventors, and t is an ordinal index of application year (i.e., t=1 refers to the
first year in which the inventor files an application, t=2 corresponds to the second year when
she files an application, etc.). The dependent variable, Yi,t+1, is an indicator that equals one if
an inventor moves between t and t+1. Note that we consolidate the information on applications
on an annual basis, so our measure of mobility records whether the inventor changed employers
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at least once during that observation window. Our main variable of interest, Patents grantedit,
is the total number of patents issued to inventor i up to (and including) spell t. The vector Zit
contains a range of time-variant covariates. First, and most importantly, Zit contains the total
number of applications filed by inventor i up to spell t. We also condition on the time elapsed
since the inventor’s first decision year, allowing mobility decisions to be shaped by seniority.
To account for sectoral differences in mobility rates, we include indicators for six non-exclusive
NBER categories in which applications are classified. Finally, Si represents the year in which
the inventor receives her first decision from the patent office. This cohort indicator controls for
the fact that inventors entering later in the panel have less time to move than do those entering
earlier. We cluster standard errors at the inventor level.
4.2. Identification strategy
As discussed in the introduction, an important concern is that β will likely be biased upwards,
since it captures the combined impact of patents granted and omitted inventor characteristics.
For example, inventors of higher quality are more likely to be the authors of inventions that
meet USPTO criteria for approval.9 Since those inventors are also more likely to be hired away
(Palomeras and Melero, 2010), this may confound any true causal effect. To overcome this
identification challenge, we use examiner leniency as an instrument for whether an inventor’s
applications are approved by the patent office and estimate Eq. (1) using a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) approach (see Gaule´, 2015; Sampat and Williams, 2015; Farre-Mensa et al.,
2017). This instrument was first proposed by Sampat and Williams (2015) based on the work
of Lemley and Sampat (2012) and Cockburn et al. (2003) on the processes and outcomes of
patent examination at the USPTO. We next describe this process to illustrate the rationale for
the instrument.
4.2.1. Rationale for the instrument: The examination process
Patent examiners at the patent office are key figures in the examination process of a patent
application. Their decisions determine eventual approval or rejection. Recent studies suggest
that the odds of receiving a patent depend on the characteristics of the particular examiner
assigned to the application (Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Frakes and Wasserman, 2016). In their
sample, Lemley and Sampat (2012) find an 11-percentage-point difference in the grant rate
between the least and the most experienced examiners who check applications related to a given
technology. Frakes and Wasserman (2016) report differences in the odds of patent approval by
examiner cohort (i.e., the year in which they were hired), which they attribute to differences in
the training received that mirrored patent office policies at that time. There is also evidence
that certain characteristics of granted patents differ by examiner.10 Cockburn et al. (2003)
and Lichtman (2004) acknowledge that patent examination is not a mechanical process and,
9The USPTO assesses whether applications should be granted patents based on the following five criteria:
patent eligibility (35 U.S.C. 101), novelty (35 U.S.C. 102), non-obviousness (35 U.S.C. 103), usefulness (35 U.S.C.
101), and an application that satisfies the disclosure requirements (35 U.S.C. 112).
10In a small and very selective sample (180 granted patents brought to the Court of Appeals at the end of the
nineties), Cockburn et al. (2003) note that characteristics such as prior citations introduced by the examiner,
citations received afterwards and the odds of being declared invalid by the courts vary with the characteristics of
the examiners.
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therefore, examiners necessarily enjoy some discretion in how they conduct the examination
and determine its outcome. Nevertheless, the allocation of applications to examiners at the
USPTO follows certain structured steps that guarantee virtually random assignment within a
given technological area (Cockburn et al., 2003; Lemley and Sampat, 2012).
At the USPTO, patent applications are received by a central office, where they are assigned
an application number, a patent class and subclass codes and allocated accordingly to one of
the art units in charge of the examination process. Art units are groups of examiners that spe-
cialize in a given set of technologies (there are more art units than patent classes but fewer than
subclasses). Once a patent is allocated to an art unit, a supervisory patent examiner (SPE)
receives the application and assigns it to a specific examiner. Each art unit is an independent
administrative division and has discretion in how work is organized, including how applications
are allocated to examiners. Interviews with patent examiners conducted by Lemley and Sam-
pat (2012) reveal that supervisory examiners make most final decisions on the assignment of
applications to examiners on a quasi-random basis (e.g., according to docket management needs
or following arbitrary rules, such as the last digit of the application number). There is no evi-
dence from these interviews that SPEs engage in any substantive evaluation of applications in
order to detect their patent-worthiness. Therefore, it is unlikely that they assign applications
to certain examiners according to such characteristics. Both Lemley and Sampat (2012) and
Sampat and Williams (2015) show that patent applications assigned to lenient and strict patent
examiners have similar observable characteristics at the time of application (number of pages,
family size and number of claims). In Appendix A.1, we replicate this exercise for other relevant
pre-determined factors, such as the size of the applicant firm or references to the patent and
non-patent literature submitted in the application. Our results do not show a significant rela-
tionship between these factors and examiner leniency. Hence, the evidence at hand suggests that
the assignment of applications to examiners can be reasonably assumed to be essentially random
within a given art unit. Consequently, we follow Sampat and Williams (2015), Gaule´ (2015), and
Farre-Mensa et al. (2017) in using examiner leniency as an instrument for application approval.
4.2.2. The instrument: Average Examiner Leniency
Our objective is to obtain an instrumental variable for the number of applications granted to
an inventor up to a given point in time. We start by operationalizing examiner leniency at the
application level. In the spirit of Gaule´ (2015), we compute time-varying measures of leniency
as follows:
Ejkat =
Grantskat − 1(Grantj = 1)
Reviewskat − 1 (2)
and
Ujat =
Grantsat − 1(Grantj = 1)
Reviewsat − 1 , (3)
where Ejkat is the approval rate of examiner k in art unit a assigned to review patent application
j submitted at time t. Reviewskat and Grantskat are the numbers of applications examiner k has
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reviewed and granted, respectively, in art unit a in the same application year as j.11 Similarly,
Ujat is the approval rate of art unit a and is constructed as the share of reviewed applications filed
in the same year as application j that were granted by art unit a, excluding the focal patent.12
The difference between Ejkat and Ujat is hence the relative leniency faced by an inventor who
files patent application j in year t assigned to examiner k within art unit a. For a single patent
application, the corresponding examiner relative leniency, Ejkat −Ujat, is a suitable instrument
for whether that application is granted. However, we are interested in obtaining an instrument
for the inventor’s total number of applications granted up to a given time. We account for this






(Ejkat − Ujat). (4)
Unlike previous literature using examiner leniency as an exogenous source of variation in
granted patents, our study averages leniency at the inventor level. This allow us to obtain an
instrument for an inventor’s stock of granted patents13, but prevent us from using within-art-unit
technology fixed effects in our main specifications. In Appendix A.2, we provide some evidence
suggesting that this is not a concern.
5. Patent grants and inventor mobility
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. The unit
of observation in our analysis is the inventor–application year. Accordingly, the figures indicate
that, on average, 11% of inventors change employers between two application years. Inventors
are, on average, responsible for 2.2 granted patents.
11Given that there may be concerns about measurement error in leniency when the set of applications is small,
we define some threshold values (10, 20, and 50) and experiment with considering only cases for which the number
of reviewed applications per examiner, year and art unit exceeds these thresholds. If anything, results are stronger
with these restrictions.
12Note that our instrument differs from that proposed by Gaule´ (2015) in two respects. First, while the author
considers the overall approval rate of an examiner, we follow Sampat and Williams (2015) and Farre-Mensa et al.
(2017) in adjusting for each art unit. Our reason for doing so is that in our sample period, on average, 39% of
examiners reviewed patent applications for multiple art units in the same year. Second, our equations differ in
the denominator, since we use the number of patent applications reviewed rather than the number of applications
filed. Nothing hinges on the use of the leniency measure in Gaule´ (2015), however.
13All the main results of this paper are robust to considering only inventor mobility in the spell after the first




Variable Mean SD Min Median Max Observations
Move 0.11 0 0 1 131,485
# of patents issued 2.2 3.7 0 1 136 131,485
# of applications filed 7.7 11.1 1 4 305 131,485
Examiner leniency 0.004 0.09 -0.86 0.01 0.74 131,485
Years since 1st decision 3.0 2.0 1 2 11 131,485
# of co-inventors 11.0 12.4 0 7 226 131,485
# of uspc classes 2.9 2.4 1 2 49 131,485
% of applications in firm’s core 0.30 0.39 0 0 1 131,485
# of applications per firm 1,263 1,776 1 449 7,803 131,485
Enforceability index -0.72 1.7 -4.2 -0.07 1.6 47,611
5.2. Baseline specification
Table 2 provides the main results. In column 1 of Table 2, we begin with the OLS estimates
of the baseline specification relating mobility to the number of patents granted and additional
controls. We find a weak, positive and significant correlation between patent grants and mobility.
This relationship cannot be interpreted as causal, however. As argued above, there are reasons
why we should expect unobservable factors to affect both the extent to which inventor’s patent
applications are approved by the USPTO and subsequent mobility.
Moving to the instrumental variable approach, column 2 presents the first stage in which
we regress the number of patents issued on examiner leniency (and all other controls). As
expected, the instrument is positive and highly significant: a one standard deviation increase in
the leniency of the examiner assigned to review an inventor’s patent application is associated
with a seven-percentage-point increase in the number of patents issued for the average inventor.
The first-stage F -statistic of the excluded instrument is large (796) and well above the rule of
thumb for weak instruments (see, e.g., Stock and Yogo, 2005), indicating that the instrument
explains a substantial part of the variation in granted patents. Column 3 reports the result
from the second-stage regressions estimating Eq. (1), with the main variable of interest replaced
with the fitted value of # of patents issued from the first-stage regression. The coefficient is
strongly negative and significant at the 1% level. The point estimate implies that an exogenous
increase in one successful patent application reduces the probability of moving by 2.8%, which
represent a 25% decrease over the conditional sample probability of 11%. This is a result of
economic significance. The substantial difference between the OLS and IV estimates highlights
the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of patent grants and indicates a strong positive
correlation between # of patents issued and the disturbance in the mobility equation, inducing
a large upward bias if we treat USPTO decisions as exogenous.
For the ease of estimation and interpretation, we use linear probability models as our main
specifications throughout the paper. In column 4 of Table 2, however, we report the results from
a probit model where we implement the instrumental variable estimator by using the control
function method (see Blundell and Powell, 2004). This leads to qualitatively and quantitatively
similar results for the coefficients on # of patents issued and, hence, supports the reasonableness
of our linear 2SLS model approximations of the average partial effects as suggested, for example,
by Wooldridge (2014).
Overall, these instrumental variable specifications provide strong evidence that patents cause,
on average, a decrease in the subsequent mobility of early-career inventors. This result suggests
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that patents make the human capital of inventors more specific to their employers. In the next
subsection, we provide a series of robustness checks to address alternative explanations, while
in Section 6, we provide additional evidence on the heterogeneity of the estimated effect to
strengthen our interpretation.
Table 2
Patent grants and inventor mobility
Base Controlling for endogeneity
OLS 2SLS Probit
Estimation method OLS (1st st.) (2nd st.) (2nd st.)
# of pats
Dependent variable Move issued Move Move
(1) (2) (3) (4)




# of patents issued (instr.) -0.028∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Years since 1st decision (L) 0.038∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
First decision year FE Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
# of applications filed FE Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Technological class FE Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
First-stage F -statistic 796
N = 131, 485. Number of inventors: 69,136. Number of firms: 2,883.
Estimation period is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by
inventor (in parentheses). Column (4) displays the average marginal effects
from a probit model with endogenous regressors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
5.3. Robustness checks
In this section, we briefly summarize a variety of tests that allow us to confirm the robustness
of our main finding. Results are reported in Appendix A.3.
First, in column 1 of Table A3, we estimate a specification that incorporates fixed effects at
a more fine-grained technology level. In our main specification, we use the six broad (one-digit)
NBER technology fields, whereas in this specification we include fixed effects that capture the
37 (two-digit) NBER sub-categories. The estimated coefficient on patent grants is identical to
the baseline coefficient.
Second, we check to what extent our estimated coefficient of interest may be subject to
attenuation bias. As suggested in Section 3, this would be the case if moving inventors were
less likely to apply for new patents than stayers. We replicate the main analysis, presented
in Table 2, for the sub-sample of inventors who obtained at least one decision on their patent
applications relatively early in our sample (i.e., prior to 2007). For this group of inventors, the
observation window is longer and, therefore, censoring is less likely (we have at least a 5-year
time window to observe another application). While 46.2% of first-time inventors are excluded
from our main sample because they are only observed once, this percentage is reduced to 26.8%
for this sub-sample. The results for this sub-sample are reported in column 2 of Table A3 and
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of our baseline estimatation.
Third, we address the concern that our results could be driven by the sub-sample of inventors
whose employers went out of business. If patents affect firm survival (as suggested by Farre-
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Mensa et al., 2017), we could be detecting purely mechanical moves following inventors’ patent
rejections (i.e., moves motivated by their employer’s bankruptcy). In column 3 of Table A3, we
report the results of a restricted analysis wherein we consider only moves away from source firms
that have at least one patent filed in the years after the registered employer change. Restricting
the analysis to this sub-set of moves produces nearly identical results to those of our baseline
estimation.
Fourth, we examine whether the estimated effect of patent grants on inventor mobility is
monotonic. To check this, we include the instrumented squared term of # of patents issued
in our model. As column 4 of Table A3 shows, the quadratic term is close to zero and not
statistically significant, whereas the linear term remains negative and significant, with a point
estimate that is substantially higher than the baseline estimate.
Fifth, one might worry that the effect we observe of patents on mobility is driven by the
threat of litigation posed by a few patent holders. As Ganco et al. (2015) note, patent holders
vary in their ”toughness” in IP litigation, which is correlated with the probability that an
inventor exits the firm. To account for this difference, we include the lagged three-year moving
sum (i.e., from t − 1 to t − 3) of the number of patent infringement lawsuits filed by the focal
employer (Litigiousness) in the main specification. We obtain this information from the Patent
Litigation Docket Reports (publicly available through the USPTO website), which contains all
patent litigation cases reported by U.S. district courts to the USPTO between 1963 and 2015. In
column 5 of Table A3, we can observe that the coefficient on # of patents issued remains identical
to the baseline coefficient, while the coefficient on Litigiousness is negative and significant (as
expected from prior research). We also interact the effect of patents on mobility with the proxy
for IP toughness. In column 6 of Table A3, we report a negative but non-significant interaction
and an estimated coefficient on patent grants of a very similar magnitude to that of the baseline
estimate. Hence, patent rights decrease inventor mobility even for employers with low litigation
profiles.
Finally, in our last robustness test, we extend the concept of patent protection beyond the
granted/non-granted dichotomy and focus on the number of approved claims as a more fine-
grained measure of this concept: the scope of the patent. Because of our reliance on examiner
leniency as an instrumental variable for patent approval, it is likely that the results presented in
Table 2 represent local average treatment effects of an additional granted patent for the group of
inventors producing innovations around the margin of approval and rejection. This analysis of
the effect of approved claims allows us to evaluate the effect of a marginal increase in the scope
of protection, which may happen at any point on the distribution of patentability. Each claim in
a patent document describes in technical terms a different element of the protected technology.
As Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) state, patent claims delimit the boundaries of the legal
protection conferred by the patent. A larger set of claims implies that the patent covers a broader
share of the technological space. Non-granted patents obviously have no approved claim, and an
increasing number of claims implies an increasing scope of protection for the patent holder. The
applicant’s incentive is to make claims that are as broad as possible in the application, as the
examiner can limit these claims during the examination process (Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2001). The scope of patent protection is therefore affected by the examination process and is
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influenced by examiner leniency. More lenient examiners not only grant more patents but also
allow a larger number of claims per patent (Cockburn et al., 2003; Lemley and Sampat, 2012).
Consequently, examiner leniency can also be used as an instrumental variable to estimate the
effect of a broader scope of patent protection on inventor mobility.
Table A4 presents the estimated effect of the average number of approved claims granted per
application on an inventor’s likelihood of moving. The number of claims can be readily obtained
from patent documents and is available from USPTO datasets. The results are qualitatively
similar to those of the analysis of patents granted. Column 2 indicates that examiner leniency
is also a strong instrument for approved claims. Column 3 presents the second stage, with
a negative and significant coefficient estimate on Avg. # of claims issued, suggesting that a
one-unit increase in the number of approved claims reduces the probability of moving by 0.3
percentage points – a 2.8% relative decrease in the probability of leaving. To examine the extent
to which these results are driven by the fact that non-granted patents have zero approved claims,
we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of granted patents. As the coefficient from the last
column of Table A4 shows, the estimated relationship between approved claims and mobility
remains negative and significant.14 Overall, these results suggest that the main finding of this
paper, i.e., the negative effect of patent protection on inventor mobility, is robust to considering
the effect of patent scope, a more fine-grained measure of patent protection than patent grants.
Consequently, they indicate that the estimated effect is not driven by a subset of inventors whose
creations lie around the approval threshold but that it is a more general phenomenon.
6. Heterogeneous impact of patent grants
The previous section documents a negative effect of patent protection on inventor mobility,
which is consistent with the idea that patent rights make the human capital of inventors specific
to their employers. In this section, we explore several sources of heterogeneity in the relationship
between patent grants and mobility in order to evaluate the existence of further evidence sup-
porting that proposition. We first examine variations in the effect across technology areas. By
drawing on the distinction between discrete and complex technologies outlined by the existing
literature, we assess whether the negative effect of patenting on mobility is more pronounced for
discrete technologies, where patents arguably provide stronger protection. Second, we explore
the role of different sources of firm specificity affecting an inventor’s stock of human capital. We
examine whether in such cases patents play a less important role as a mechanism that turns
inventor’s knowledge into firm-specific capital and, thus, affect mobility less intensely. Finally,
we examine whether patenting makes an inventor especially less likely to move to firms that are
technologically similar to her current employer.
6.1. Variation across technology fields
Our argument is that the negative effect of patents on mobility presented in the previous
section should be particularly strong in contexts where patents are more effective. The tradi-
14The results from this last piece of evidence, however, have to be interpreted with caution, since excluding
inventors without granted patents from the analysis is likely to induce some sample selection bias.
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tional dichotomy between complex and discrete technologies is particularly useful in this respect.
Mansfield (1986) and Levin et al. (1987) find that patenting is a key strategy for appropriating
returns to R&D in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, while it is less important in most other indus-
tries. Cohen et al. (2000) push this issue further and suggest that these differences are linked to
the nature of the technology and to the physical characteristics of the products. Their rationale
is that the number of patentable elements in a product importantly affects the way patents are
used and, in turn, the degree to which they contribute to effective protection. In discrete indus-
tries, new products typically build on a few clearly identifiable features. Hence, only one or a
few patents are required to achieve effective protection against imitation. This is the case in the
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, where compounds are typically adequately protected
by single patents. In contrast, new products in complex industries, such as electronics, require
inputs from numerous complementary components, typically protected by patents held by an ar-
ray of third parties. This makes the protection conferred by a single patent on a new component
inherently less valuable, since it is necessary to have or acquire the rights on other proprietary
elements to bring a new product to market. For these reasons, patents are reported to be less
effective against imitation in complex product industries relative to alternatives such as secrecy,
lead time or complementary capabilities (Cohen et al., 2000).15 Therefore, we should observe
that the negative impact of patents on inventor mobility is stronger in discrete (compared to
complex) technology fields.
In order to empirically identify the technology field for each patent application, we rely on
the NBER categorization. As there is no widely accepted classification that links those cate-
gories to discrete or complex technology areas, we focus on the clear-cut cases identified in the
prior literature. Following Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000), we classify chemicals
(category 1) and drugs (sub-category 31) as discrete and computers and communications (cat-
egory 2), medical instruments (sub-category 32), biotechnology (sub-category 33) and electric
and electronics (category 4) as complex technology fields.16 We then aggregate this information
at the inventor–application year level and construct two time-variant dummy variables, Discrete
and Complex, that equal one if the inventor’s largest share of applications up to spell t belongs
to discrete or complex technology classes, respectively, and zero otherwise.17 In our sample, the
average mobility rate between two application years is 13% for inventors in discrete areas and
10% for those in complex areas.
15This claim is also line with the results of econometric studies that attempt to quantify the private value of
patent protection across sectors (see, e.g., Lanjouw, 1998; Arora et al., 2008).
16Traditionally, biotechnology was classified as discrete due to its intrinsic technological characteristics. How-
ever, the possibility of patenting gene fragments since the late nineties contributed to the fragmentation of the
patent rights needed for the commercialization of a product in this area (Cohen et al., 2000). Thus, following
recent papers, such as Galasso and Schankerman (2015), we classify biotechnology as complex. The results are
robust to the exclusion of biotech as a complex field.
17Because some technological areas are neither complex nor discrete, some 19,234 inventor-year observations




Estimation method: 2SLS Discrete and
Sample All Discrete Complex complex
Dependent variable: Move (1) (2) (3) (4)
# of patents issued (instr.) -0.027∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
# of patents issued -0.026 -0.034∗
× Discrete (instr.) (0.018) (0.019)
# of patents issued 0.008





N 131,485 23,991 88,260 110,330
# of inventors 69,136 13,632 46,498 58,296
# of firms 2,883 1,277 1,823 2,523
Wald χ2 2.96∗
Estimation period is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by in-
ventor (in parentheses). All regressions control for the number of years since
inventor’s first decision (log), as well as fixed effects for the number of appli-
cations filed by the inventor and the year of inventor’s first decision. Wald
tests for differences in coefficients between # of patents issued x Discrete and
# of patents issued x Complex. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
We examine the impact of patents on mobility by technology field using the instrumental
variable discussed above. Column 1 of Table 3 provides the estimates obtained using the full
sample. Specifically, we augment Eq. (1) by including two instrumented interaction terms to
capture how different appropriability regimes alter the effect of patents on inventor mobility. The
coefficient on the first interaction term, # of patents issued x Discrete, is large and negative,
while that of # of patents issued x Complex is small and positive, although neither is statistically
significant. The corresponding Wald test indicates, however, that these two coefficients are
statistically significantly different from one another. These findings indicate, as predicted, that
the negative effect of patents on inventor mobility is stronger when inventors’ patent filings are
concentrated in discrete technologies instead of complex fields. Columns 2 and 3 present the
results of estimating our baseline 2SLS model separately for the subsamples of inventors working
mainly in complex technologies and those working mainly in discrete fields. The results show
that the effect of patent grants is large, negative and significant among inventors whose main
expertise lies in a discrete technology field, whereas it is smaller among inventors in complex
areas. One additional patent granted is expected to reduce the probability of moving by 2.2%
for inventors in a complex field (a 22% decrease over the conditional sample probability of 10%)
and by 5.4% for those in a discrete field (a 42% decrease over the conditional sample probability
of 13%). Finally, column 4 provides estimates using the combined sub-samples and interacting
# of patents issued with Discrete. Consistent with the previous findings, the coefficient on the
interaction term is negative and significant at the 10% level.
6.2. Other sources of firm-specific human capital
A second analysis considers the extent to which different sources of an inventor’s firm-specific
human capital shape the effect of patents on mobility. In particular, our arguments suggest that
the effect will be less negative when other types of human capital firm specificity are already in
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place, and it will be more intense otherwise. To explore this question, we look at cases in which
the inventor’s knowledge becomes more valuable when implemented in collaboration with that
of other inventors in the company or in conjunction with some of the current employer’s key
assets. We also analyze whether the effect of patents is attenuated in the presence of another
legally induced source of firm specificity: non-compete covenants.
In the context of innovation studies, the literature suggests two potential sources of firm
specificity for inventors’ human capital. First, Hayes et al. (2006) argue that firm specificity
derives from complementarities with the firm’s other workers. In particular, by learning to work
with each other over time, individual employees develop a stock of human capital that is specific
to co-workers and difficult to re-build with others. In the context of invention generation, Jaravel
et al. (2015) show that inventors who experience an unexpected death of a co-inventor face large
and long-lasting losses in earnings and productivity. Thus, strong collaborative relationships
such as those established in teams of inventors imply that each individual needs complementary
knowledge from other inventors to extract the maximum value of her own knowledge. This
makes departure decisions more costly for the inventor and reduces her relative attractiveness
to outside employers, since competitors that aim to replicate a body of knowledge must hire
away the whole team (Palomeras and Melero, 2010). Therefore, we expect the negative impact
of patent grants on mobility to be more intense for solo inventors than for inventors with many
co-authors.
A second source of firm-specific human capital is suggested by Lazear (2009), who notes
that most specific human capital is, in fact, a combination of general purpose skills applied in
a combination that is specific to the firm. Innovative companies tend to establish technologi-
cal trajectories linked to their core competences, with accompanying patterns of standardized
routines and procedures (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007). This implies
that the particular combination of skills used by inventors working in the company’s core areas
is especially idiosyncratic to the firm and, therefore, difficult to transfer.18 Thus, we expect
that the negative impact of patent grants on mobility is larger for inventors working outside the
firm’s core technologies than for inventors employed in the firm’s core.
We empirically explore the effects of the above-mentioned sources of firm-specific skills by
using the following proxies: (i) the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of unique co-
inventors with whom an inventor has worked in her applications up to t and (ii) the percentage
of her patent applications that fall in the firm’s core technology areas. Following Song et al.
(2003), we consider a technology area part of the core if its corresponding patent class appears
with a frequency greater than 10% in the firm’s application portfolio (over the entire sample
period). We control in these regressions for the inventor’s degree of specialization (captured by
the number of different patent classes into which her applications fall) and firm size (proxied
by the number of applications filed by the firm in that year), which are relevant controls to
18The firm specificity of core skills is illustrated by the following example. In 1970, Intel planned to invest
in developing the first semiconductor DRAM (dynamic random access memory), the 1-kilobit 1103. Despite its
economic attractiveness, Intel’s engineers were seriously concerned about the potential negative consequences of
developing knowledge and skills specific to DRAM technology. As noted by Gordon Moore, then CEO of Intel,
“[t]here was a lot of resistance to semiconductor technology on the part of the core memory engineers. The
engineers didn’t embrace the 1103 until they realized that it wouldn’t make their skills irrelevant” (Cogan and
Burgelman, 1989, p. 2-3).
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consistently estimate the effect of co-inventors and core areas.
Table 4 presents the results of the interactions between sources of firm specificity and patent
grants on mobility. The first column reproduces the baseline model to which we add the variables
and controls mentioned in this subsection. We are interested in the interactions between the
variables capturing the firm specificity of skills and the number of patents the inventor has
been granted. In columns 2 and 3, we add these (instrumented) multiplicative terms separately.
Column 4 shows the results for the full model. As expected, the figures from the interaction
effects in columns 2 to 4 show that the negative impact of patent grants on mobility is most
intense for solo inventors and for inventors working outside the firm’s core technologies.
Table 4
Firm-specific human capital: patent grants, co-inventors and core technologies
Estimation method: 2SLS
Dependent variable: Move (1) (2) (3) (4)
# of patents issued (instr.) -0.030∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021)
# of patents issued 0.021∗∗∗ 0.015∗
× # of co-inventors (L) (instr.) (0.007) (0.008)
# of patents issued 0.041∗∗ 0.035∗
× % of applications in firm’s core (instr.) (0.018) (0.018)
# of co-inventors (L) 0.000 -0.043∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.031∗
(0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.017)
% of applications in firm’s core -0.045∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.034) (0.035)
# of uspc classes (L) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
# of applications per firm (L) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N = 131, 485. Number of inventors: 69,136. Number of firms: 2,883. Estimation period
is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by inventor (in parentheses). All
regressions control for the number of years since inventor’s first decision (log), fixed effects
for the number of applications filed by the inventor, the technology field and the year of
inventor’s first decision. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
We also consider the role of non-compete contracts as a related mechanism that increases
the firm specificity of inventors’ human capital. Non-competes are contractual clauses included
in labor contracts that explicitly prevent employees from working for a competitor within a
certain time window, typically two years, in case of termination of the labor relationship with
the current employer. These covenants are a particular case of trade secret law, which aims
to safeguard critical information (both technical and non-technical) that firms decide to keep
secret. Non-compete contracts are prevalent among R&D workers and have been found to reduce
inventor mobility in states that enforce them (Marx et al., 2009). U.S. jurisdictions, however,
differ in their degree of enforcement of these covenants. Courts have sometimes understood that
employees cannot be forbidden to seek jobs in the industry in which they have expertise. In
California, for instance, non-competes are practically unenforceable (Gilson, 1999). Thus, the
substitutability argument suggests that patents should discourage mobility, especially in states
in which non-compete covenants are not enforced.
To examine whether our results differ according to the level of enforcement of non-competes
in the corresponding state, we rely on the enforceability index compiled by Starr (2016). We use
the inventor address provided in patent filing for the geographical allocation of inventors to U.S.
states. Because this information is not available for all inventors in our dataset, we examine a
sub-sample of 25,439 inventors from 1,511 firms.
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Table 5
Firm-specific human capital: patent grants and non-compete enforceability
Estimation method: 2SLS Non-enforcing Enforcing
Sample All All All All states states All
Dependent variable: Move (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
# of patents issued (instr.) -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.002)
# of patents issued 0.001 0.002
× Enforceability index (instr.) (0.005) (0.005)
Enforceability index -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.003) (0.013)
# of patents issued 0.011




N 47,611 47,611 47,611 47,611 10,031 37,580 47,611
# of inventors 25,439 25,439 25,439 25,439 5,480 20,152 25,439
# of firms 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 635 1,183 1,511
Estimation period is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level (in parentheses). All regres-
sions control for the number of years since inventor’s first decision (log), fixed effects for the number of applications
filed by the inventor, the technology field and the year of inventor’s first decision. Enforceability scores for each state
are from Starr (2016). Non-enforcing states are California and North Dakota. Since non-competes are enforceable in
the state where the employee is located, we use information on inventor’s location from the last patent application
prior to observing the outcome. Since this information is not available for all inventors, the number of observations is
lower in this analysis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In column 1 of Table 5, we re-estimate Eq. (1) on this sub-sample. The coefficient on # of
patents issued is -0.034 and significant at the 1% level. In column 2, we add the enforceability
index, and we observe that mobility rates decline with the strength of non-compete enforcement,
as in Marx et al. (2009). In columns 3 through 7, we then re-estimate the effect of patent grants
on mobility by including their interaction term (and state-level fixed effects) and splitting the
sample into clearly non-enforcing states (i.e., California and North Dakota) and the rest. Though
the estimated effect of patenting on mobility is smaller for enforcing states than for non-enforcing
ones, the difference (as captured by the interaction terms) is not statistically significant.
In sum, the evidence presented in this section regarding the relationship between patent
rights and other sources of firm-specific human capital is not conclusive. While patent protec-
tion has the strongest effect as a retention mechanism for inventors without many co-authors
and inventors outside the technological core of the company, we do not observe a similar substi-
tutability pattern between patents and non-compete contracts.
6.3. Similarity between hiring and focal firms
Our last test of heterogeneous effects concerns different types of inter-firm moves. The com-
plementarity of patent rights with the human capital of the corresponding inventors is expected
to affect all type of moves. However, the appropriation effect resulting from the impact of patent
rights on the balance of incentives to hire or retain inventors will only be relevant for technolog-
ically similar firms capable of implementing the innovation. Thus, the negative effect of patent
grants on mobility observed in this study should more intensely affect moves to alternative
employers in the technological vicinity of the current employer than moves to technologically
distant firms, which have little chance of implementing an inventor’s innovations.
To test this prediction, we characterize inter-firm technological similarity using a measure
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that captures whether the hiring and focal firms overlap in terms of core technologies. Using
the same definition of a firm’s core technology area used in Section 6.2, we create a categorical
variable that is set to 0 when the inventor stays at the focal firm, to 1 when she leaves and at
least one of the core technology domains of the two firms is identical; and to 2 when she leaves
and there is no overlap in core areas. We then estimate a multinomial logit model that allows
us to capture the effect of patent grants on the relative probability of each type of move.19
Table 6 shows the relative risk ratios that result from the analysis. As the first two columns
show, one additional patent issued reduces the relative risk that an inventor moves to both
technologically overlapping and non-overlapping employers with respect to the omitted “stay”
option (both relative risks are multiplied by a factor smaller than one after a patent grant).
This is consistent with the complementarity effect of patents on inventor mobility, which drives
down the probability of all types of moves. A comparison of the size of the estimated ratios
suggests, as predicted, that the effect is more intense for moves to employers with overlapping
core technologies than for all other employers. The last column of Table 6 shows the relative risk
ratios corresponding to the choice between the two types of moves, with moving to employers
with no core technological overlap as the reference category. As expected, the figures indicate
that an additional patent grant significantly decreases the relative risk that a moving inventor
switches to a technologically similar employer instead of switching to an unrelated one.20 This is
consistent with the existence of an appropriation effect that concerns exclusively technologically
close employers.
Table 6




Dependent variable Stay Stay Move
Estimation method: Multinomial Logit (1) (2) (3)
# of patents issued (instr.) 0.694∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗
N = 131, 485. Number of inventors: 69,136. Number of firms: 2,883.
Estimation period is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are clustered
by inventor (in parentheses). All regressions control for the number of
years since inventor’s first decision (log), fixed effects for the number of
applications filed by the inventor, the technology field and the year of
inventor’s first decision. Coefficients are expressed in terms of relative
risk ratios. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
7. Discussion and conclusion
In this study we investigate the effect of patent protection on the mobility prospects of inven-
tors. We argue that, by making inventors’ knowledge more specific to their current employers,
patent grants decrease inter-firm mobility.
In order to test this idea, we examine the impact of obtaining a patent on the mobility
19Again, we used the control function approach proposed by Blundell and Powell (2004) and Wooldridge (2014)
to correct for the endogeneity of issued patents with the average examiner leniency instrument in the multinomial
logit model.
20In unreported extensions, we distinguish between a hiring firm whose core technology overlaps with the
mobile inventor’s own technological expertise (instead of her previous employer’s core technology) to categorize
moves. Replicating the specification of Table 6 for the alternative categorization produces similar results to those
presented here.
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patterns of the inventors involved in applications. Since inventions that result in granted and
not granted patents are expected to be inherently different, we adopt an instrumental variables
approach to estimate the effect of patenting on inventors’ mobility. In particular, and following
previous literature, we use variations in the granting rates of patent examiners within an art
unit (leniency) as an exogenous source of variation in patent grants. We analyze the early
careers of employee inventors who apply for patents in the USPTO for the first time between
2001 and 2012. Our results indicate that patenting does cause a substantial decrease in the
mobility of inventors in their early careers, suggesting that patent grants make human capital
more specific to the inventor’s current employer. Additional evidence provides further support
for this hypothesis: (i) the negative effect of patents on mobility is particularly strong in discrete
technologies, where patent protection is more effective, (ii) patents have a less negative effect
on mobility when other sources of firm specificity are present. In particular, complementarities
with co-inventors and employer’s assets make an inventor’s knowledge set more difficult to
transfer outside the company, and (iii) patents make inventors especially less likely to move to
technologically close alternative employers (compared to technologically distant ones). Among
several other robustness tests, we extend the concept of patent protection from patent grants
to the number of approved claims. The results of this analysis suggest that the appropriation
effect is present over the whole population of patent applicants and not only for those producing
innovations in the margin of approval and rejection.
One element of markets for inventors that our study does not address is the potential role of
patents as signals of inventor ability. Previous findings in the labor economics and innovation
literatures suggest that patents could reveal information about inventive skills. Patents have
been frequently argued to work as signals of firm quality in situations of asymmetric informa-
tion in entrepreneurial finance markets (Long, 2002; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Conti et al., 2013).
Analogously, patents could act as signals in the labor market for highly skilled employees, where
employers are particularly likely to enjoy private information about the ability of their workers
(Scho¨nberg, 2007). By providing a signal to the labor market about the quality of the inventors
responsible for the innovation, patent documents could decrease the amount of private infor-
mation held by current employers and thus increase inventor mobility. Our empirical strategy,
however, is based on a comparison of patent filings that have been granted and those that have
not. Since the immense majority of filings are public, we would expect signaling effects to be
mainly associated to patent application events and not to grant events. Indeed, it is at the time
of the publication of the application when the information about the innovation and its inventors
is released to the market. Thus, it is conceivable that the negative effect of patent grants on
inventor mobility is preceded by a positive effect of applications due to signaling effects.
Notwithstanding the previous caveat, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that
patent protection makes the human capital of inventors more firm specific and, therefore, lowers
the likelihood of moving. This result has important public policy implications. First, it sug-
gests that patents, despite making public some codified knowledge, may have a growth-reducing
effect by hampering the diffusion of tacit know-how. By inducing lower mobility rates, they
may reduce the spread of non-codified knowledge associated with the protected technology and,
more generally, of other know-how not related to the replicability of a specific innovation. Fur-
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thermore, this appropriation-induced reduction in mobility may also contribute to an inefficient
allocation of inventor’s skills. Evidence from Hoisl (2007) shows that inventors tend to experi-
ence productivity increases when they switch firms, suggesting that career moves are frequently
motivated by employer-employee match improvements. To the extent that patents discourage
mobility, they will also inhibit these efficiency improvements. Aditionally, our results also sug-
gest that patents generate a shift in incentives to invest in human capital from the employees
(i.e., the inventors) to their employers (i.e., the patent holders). This shift may encourage some
efficient investments in training that might not have been otherwise carried out by the inventors
themselves because of financial constraints or risk considerations.
Last but not least, our findings bring to light an important methodological issue. If patent
grants affect the mobility prospects of the authors of the inventions, tracking inventors’ careers
through their issued patents (as most studies have done until now) introduces a downward bias
in the detection of mobility. This bias may expand to analyses of causes and consequences of
mobility as well. To avoid it, further studies at the inventor level should take into account both
patent applications and grants.
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Appendix for
“The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility”
This Appendix provides additional material to the results presented in “The Effect of Patent
Protection on Inventor Mobility.” In Section A.1, we present evidence that supplement the
picture that the assignment of applications to examiners is plausibly random. In Section A.2,
we discuss and report robustness checks for the first stage estimates. In Section A.3, we report
the results of the robustness tests referred in section 5.3 of the article. Descriptive statistics for
variables used in this Appendix are presented in A.4.sta
A.1. Investigating selection
The details of the examination process described in Section 4.2 of the article suggest that
patent applications are assigned to examiners quasi-randomly within art units. Here, we provide
further evidence that our proposed instrument (at the patent level) satisfies the exclusion restric-
tion. For this restriction to hold, examiner leniency should only be related with inventor mobility
through its influence on the probability that her patent application is granted. Therefore, we
aim to test whether there is any correlation between the characteristics of patent applications
(at the time of filing) that can be related with the likelihood that their authors move firms and
our measure of examiner leniency (at the patent level). As discussed by Lemley and Sampat
(2012), the assessment of whether a certain type of inventions are assigned to examiners with a
certain leniency is challenging for two reasons: (i) it is difficult to identify variables that at the
time of application would capture the characteristics of the underlying invention and (ii) much
of the front-page information contained in patent documents is not available for applications.
One of the most important characteristics of patent applications that can affect the probabil-
ity of their inventors to move is the value of the underlying innovation, since it is correlated with
the inventors’ ability (Palomeras and Melero, 2010; Ganco et al., 2015). Though the most com-
mon measure to proxy for value of patented innovations (e.g. citations received) is not available
at the time of application and, therefore, is not useful for our purposes, there is an alternative
proxy for value that it is available at filing. This is the patent family size, i.e. the number
of jurisdictions in which the application is filed. Because of the substantially higher costs of
filing, one expects that applicants are more likely to seek broad international protection only if
the invention is economically relevant (Putnam, 1996). Prior literature provides evidence that
family size is correlated with a quality index of patents (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004), the
likelihood that a patent will be granted (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000) and
the economic value of patent rights (Harhoff et al., 2003). We define a patent family in terms
of patent equivalents, using as our measure of family size the number of unique jurisdictions in
which the focal U.S. patent application was filed at the time of application and protecting the
same invention. We construct this measure using the algorithm described in Martinez (2010)
on the data extracted from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (Patstat, April 2012
edition). We are able to recover this information for all of our patent applications filed between
2001 and 2011 provided that, by January 2012, they were made public (patent applications are
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made public after 18 months from application or at the resolution date if this happens before).
The final sample results in 329,666 observations for which we have non-missing values for exam-
iner leniency and application data. We report the results of the OLS regression of family size on
examiner leniency (as described in subsection 4.2.2) in Column 1 of Table A1. We use art-unit
fixed-effects in order to control for potential patterns regarding family size across technologies.
We find that the key coefficient on examiner is small (0.003) and insignificant (p-value = 0.877),
suggesting that more lenient examiners are unlikely to be systematically assigned more valuable
patent applications.
Another used measure for value of (potentially) patented innovations is the number of back-
ward references. A relatively high number of references to previous patents and non-patent
literature may indicate innovations of relatively high value, although this is not entirely unam-
biguous (see Harhoff et al., 2003). Given the importance of cited prior art in later litigation, the
idea is that an applicant who seeks to protect a more valuable invention might have incentives
to delineate the patent claims by inserting more references to prior art. Note that U.S. patent
law imposes a duty of candor on patent applicants to disclose to the Patent Office any infor-
mation that is “material” to the issuance of the patent (see 37 C.F.R. 1.56). A failure to do so
may render the resulting patent unenforceable. We use then the number of applicant-submitted
references to patent and non-patent literature at the time of filing available in Patstat. This
data is only available though for the subset of applications that are eventually issued as patents.
Also in this case, results suggest that there is no clear evidence that more lenient examiners get
assigned applications that could protect potentially more valuable innovations.
Finally, we test whether there might be selection based on applicants’ size, since this may
be a factor that could influence the likelihood of inventors to move. We use as a proxy for size
the number of patent applications the applicant filed in the previous year. The last column of
Table A1 report an insignificant coefficient on examiner leniency.
Table A1
Examiner relative leniency and application characteristics
Applicant PAT Applicant NPL Applicant APP
Dependent variable Family size References References Volumet−1
Estimation method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Examiner leniency 0.003 0.433 0.223 -37.600
(0.022) (0.347) (0.271) (26.413)
Filing year FE Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Art unit FE Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
N 329,666 164,832 164,832 341,007
# of examiners 9,855 7,629 7,629 9,918
Estimation period is 2001–2011 in columns 1 to 3 and 2002–2011 in columns 4 and 5.
Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner (in parentheses). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
A.2. Robustness tests for the first stage results
In this Appendix, we test whether our measure of examiner leniency (at the patent level)
may be driven by technological effects within an art unit. Even though art units correspond
to quite delimited technological areas, there may be subareas within an art unit that differ in
the patentability of their applications. We can only distinguish these technological sub-areas by
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looking at the classes and subclasses to which the application is assigned to. Though art units
are typically a more fine-grained classification of technologies (there are more art units than tech-
nological classes), in some cases there may co-exist different classes or, more frequently, different
subclasses in an art unit (see https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification). Therefore,
we want to rule out that part of the variation in the measured leniency across examiners may
be due to the variation in grant rates across technological (sub)classes within an art unit. This
issue is particularly important because we do not conduct our analysis at the patent level but
at the inventor level (i.e., we aggregate our relative leniency measure over the applications filed
by a given inventor up to a given moment of time), and therefore we cannot include (sub)class
fixed-effects in our empirical specifications. We explore whether the aforementioned techno-
logical effects may be a concern for our measure of examiner leniency by testing whether the
correlation between examiner leniency and patent grant varies substantially when we include
more fine-grained technological controls. Table A2 contains the results from this robustness test.
Column 1 contains the baseline correlation between examiner leniency and patent grant without
introducing any technological control. Note that our examiner leniency measure is constructed
relative to the art unit and year [see Eq. (2) and (4) of the paper]. This is why we obtain a very
similar coefficient when we introduce fixed effects by art unit and year (column 2). Column 3
introduces art unit, year and class fixed effects, in order to control for the effects of classes that
either expand over different art units or that share the art unit with another class. Next, we
control for the most stringent fixed effects, at the art-unit, year and sub-class level (note that
sub-classes are nested in classes). Across all these more stringent specifications, the correlation
of examiner leniency and patent grant does not present substantial variations with respect to
the baseline model, suggesting that our leniency measure is not the result of differences in the
patentability across technological areas inside an art unit.
Table A2
Technology classification, examiner leniency and patent grants
Dependent variable: Patent grant
Art unit × Art unit ×
Art unit × USPC class × Sub-class ×
Technology FE included None Filing year Filing year Filing year
Estimation method: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Examiner leniency 0.737∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
N = 353, 976. Number of examiners: 10,142. Number of art-units: 626. Number of
USPC classes: 413. Number of sub-classes: 41,898. Estimation period is 2001–2011.
Robust standard errors are clustered by examiner (in parentheses). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
A.3. Other robustness tests
In this section, we present additional regression results corresponding to the robustness tests
referred in Section 5.3 of the article.
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Table A3
Patent grants and inventor mobility–Miscellaneous robustness tests
Estimation method: 2SLS 1st dec. Active
Sample All up to 2006 firms All All All
Dependent variable: Move (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of patents issued (instr.) -0.028∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.008)
# of patents issued 0.002
× # of patents issued (instr.) (0.002)
Litigiousness -0.001∗∗ 0.008
(0.001) (0.019)
# of patents issued -0.003
× Litigiousness (instr.) (0.007)
Refined (2-digit) Tech class FE Yes∗∗∗
N 131,485 69,069 130,082 131,485 131,485 131485
# of inventors 69,136 36,403 68,065 69,136 69,136 69,136
# of firms 2,883 2,115 2,471 2,883 2,883 2,883
Robust standard errors are clustered by inventor (in parentheses). All regressions control for the number
of years passed since inventor’s first decision (log), and fixed effects for the number of applications filed
by the inventor and the year of inventor’s first decision. Technology field fixed effects use six categories
in columns 2 through 6, and 37 sub-categories in column 1. Litigiousness is defined as the moving sum
of the number of unique patent infringement lawsuits initiated by the source firm from year t − 1 to
year t− 3 (see Ganco et al., 2015). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A4
Claims and inventor mobility
Sample All All All Patents Patents Patents
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
(1st st.) (2nd st.) (1st st.) (2nd st.)
Avg. # of Avg. # of
Dependent variable Move claims iss. Move Move claims iss. Move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. # of claims issued -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Examiner lenciency 18.075∗∗∗ 12.415∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.426)
Avg. # of claims issued (instr.) -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
First-stage F -statistic 2,721 566
N = 131, 485 (111, 921 in column 4–6). Number of inventors: 69,136 (57,926 in column 4–6). Number
of firms: 2,883 (2,567 in column 4–6). Estimation period is 2001–2011. Robust standard errors are
clustered by inventor (in parentheses). All regressions control for the number of years passed since
inventor’s first decision (log), and fixed effects for the number of applications filed by the inventor
and the year of inventor’s first decision. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
A.4. Descriptive statistics of appendix variables
Table A5
Descriptive statistics (Robustness tests)
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max Observations
Application-level characteristics
Family size 1.5 1.7 0 1 27 329,666
Applicant PAT references 4.3 13.4 0 0 105 164,832
Applicant NPL references 1.5 8.2 0 0 99 164,832
Applicant APP volumet−1 1,261 1,840 0 427 7,803 341,007
Inventor-level characteristics
Litigiousness 0.79 1.5 0 0 10 131,485
Avg. # of claims issued 12.6 8.9 0 11.5 248 131,485
iv
